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LAW AND VIOLENCE IN ELEVENTH-CENTURY FRANCE1 
 
Making sense of violence remains one of the central interpretative challenges in the history of 
eleventh-century France. Charters written by churchmen contain frequent, sometimes lengthy 
descriptions of violent acts committed by both laymen and fellow ecclesiastics. Two 
questions in particular have focused historians’ attempts to understand such violence. The 
first has been how to explain the relationship between violence and eleventh-century legal 
institutions. For an older generation of historians — though whose views still find support — 
the relationship was direct: the violence recorded in the sources was a consequence of the 
failure of contemporary institutions to contain it.2 The cause of this failure was long thought 
to lie in the collapse of the Carolingian political and legal structures epitomised by the mallus 
publicus, or public court. Public courts were, it was argued, privatised and taken over by 
lords acting in their private, rather than public interest, thus causing a crisis of confidence in 
legal institutions, and resulting in the widespread preference to settle disputes through force, 
rather than law.3 Debate since the work of Georges Duby in the late 1940s has concentrated 
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participants at those conferences for their comments and suggestions. I am particularly grateful to Kenneth 
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of Structuralist History: Re-reading Burgundian Judicial Institutions’, in Warren C. Brown and Piotr Górecki 
(eds.), Conflict in Medieval Europe: Changing Perspectives on Medieval Society (Aldershot, 2003), 37–68; and 
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on whether this change occurred rapidly in the decades around the year 1000 — the thesis of 
the mutation féodale —, or more gradually as scholars like Marc Bloch or Yvonne Bongert 
believed.4 Regardless of chronology, however, the consequences were the same: the crisis 
faced by moribund Carolingian legal institutions was thought to have unleashed the social 
violence of the ‘feudal anarchy.’  
 Few now subscribe to this sombre image. Influenced by anthropological studies of 
conflict in small-scale acephalous societies, historians, led by the pioneering works of Fredric 
Cheyette and Stephen White in the 1970s and 1980s, fundamentally challenged and revised 
the underlying assumption of the mutation féodale thesis that the state was essential in the 
maintenance of social order.5 Despite considerable variety in approach and emphasis, this 
body of work cogently demonstrated that societies lacking the specialised legal institutions of 
the state did not descend into anarchy, and that they possessed effective means of maintaining 
order.6 Yet in recasting violence within the framework of dispute-processing and the social 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
idem, ‘Public Court Practice: The Eighth and Twelfth Centuries Compared’, in Stefan Esders (ed.), 
Rechtsverständnis und Konfliktbewältigung: Gerichtliche und außergerichtliche Strategien im Mittelalter 
(Cologne, 2007), 17–30. 
4 The starting point remains Georges Duby, La Société aux XIe et XIIe siècles dans la région mâconnaise (Paris, 
1953). Debate on the subject of mutation féodale is vast. In addition to the literature in n. 1, above, see now in 
particular Richard E. Barton, Lordship in the County of Maine, c.890–1160 (Woodbridge, 2004); Charles West, 
Reframing the Feudal Revolution: Political and Social Transformation between Marne and Moselle, c.800–
c.1100 (Cambridge, 2013); Jean-Pierre Poly and Éric Bournazel, La Mutation féodale. Xe–XIIe siècle, 3rd ed. 
(Paris, 2004); and Dominique Barthélemy, La Mutation féodale de l’an mil a-t-elle eu lieu? Servage et 
chevalerie dans la France des Xe et XIe siècles (Paris, 1997). For the older chronology, see Bloch, Feudal 
Society; and Yvonne Bongert, Recherches sur les cours laïques du Xe au XIIIe siècle (Paris, 1949). 
5 Fredric L. Cheyette, ‘Suum cuique tribuere’, French Historical Studies, vol. 6, no. 3 (1970), 287–99 and the 
articles collected in Stephen D. White, Feuding and Peace-Making in Eleventh-Century France (Aldershot, 
2005). It is important to stress that neither Cheyette nor White originally imagined their work as a critique of the 
mutation féodale; Dominique Barthélemy, La Société dans le comté de Vendôme de l’an mil au XIVe siècle 
(Paris, 1993), 652–80, however, noted that ‘Anglo-American legal anthropology’ leads ‘ineluctably’ to a 
rejection of mutationisme, see ibid., 660, n. 70 in particular. Broader orientation to dispute-processing is 
provided in Brown and Górecki, Conflict in Medieval Europe; Le Règlement des conflits au moyen âge. XXXIe 
Congrès de la S.H.M.E.S. (Paris, 2001); and the now classic Wendy Davies and Paul Fouracre (eds.), The 
Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval Europe (Cambridge, 1986). See also John Jordan, ‘Rethinking 
Disputes and Settlements: How Historians Can Use Legal Anthropology’, in Stephen Cummins and Laura 
Kounine (eds.), Cultures of Conflict Resolution in Early Modern Europe (Farnham, 2016), 17–50. 
6 Studies of feud and vengeance are particularly relevant here. See in particular Dominique Barthélemy, 
Chevaliers et miracles. La violence et le sacré dans la société féodale (Paris, 2004), and White, Feuding and 
Peace-Making. The essays in Dominique Barthélemy, François Bougard, and Régine le Jan (eds.), La 
Vengeance, 400-1200. Collection de l’École française de Rome 357 (Rome, 2006) and Jeppe Büchert 
Netterstrøm and Bjørn Poulsen (eds.), Feud in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Aarhus, 2007) provide 
good orientation to this large topic. 
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regulation of conflict, these studies risked perpetuating the underlying assumptions of the 
mutation féodale thesis that eleventh-century violence was in some way related to the 
absence (or failure) of contemporary legal institutions: what had been questioned was the 
moral evaluation of violence, not the more fundamental question of its relationship to 
eleventh-century courts.7 Take for example Warren Brown’s recent assessment: ‘the political 
transformation visible in the early Capetian sources [of France] did not replace public order 
with violent disorder’, but rather, ‘it provoked a large-scale shift in the normative order’, 
which was expressed as ‘the personal right to violence.’ Brown then stresses that this ‘large-
scale shift’ occurred because ‘most lords… were unable to exercise control’ over those 
wielding violence.8  
 Such views have dovetailed with historians’ second main question directed towards the 
violence recorded in charters: how to understand this violence as discourse? Starting in the 
1990s, scholars led by Dominique Barthélemy began to emphasise that accounts of violence 
survived in ex parte records, written by churchmen all too keen to cast themselves as victims 
of lay rapacity.9 Such arguments were initially formulated as a critique of the mutation 
féodale thesis and the sometimes simplistic way such violence was thought to reflect social 
realities. In 1996 Stephen White, drawing on the influential work of Otto Brunner, 
highlighted the dangers of relying on ‘polemically charged religious sources’ to reconstruct 
social attitudes surrounding the meaning and rôle of violence.10 Further, in 1997 Olivier 
                                                          
7 See in particular Patrick J. Geary, ‘Living with Conflicts in a Stateless France: A Typology of Conflict 
Management Mechanisms, 1050–1200’, in idem, Living with the Dead in the Middle Ages (Ithaca and London, 
1994), 125–60, and Henk Teunis, The Appeal to the Original Status: Social Justice in Anjou in the Eleventh 
Century (Hilversum, 2006), itself largely modelled off Geary’s study. For criticism of these paradigms, see 
above-all Bruno Lemesle, Conflits et justice au Moyen Âge. Normes, loi et résolution des conflits en Anjou aux 
XIe et XIIe siècles (Paris, 2008), and note too Stephen D. White, ‘From Peace to Power: the Study of Disputes in 
Medieval France’, in Esther Cohen and Mayke B. de Jong (eds.), Medieval Transformations: Texts, Power, and 
Gifts in Context (Leiden, 2000), 203–18. 
8 Warren Brown, Violence in Medieval Europe (Harlow, 2011), 126. 
9 Dominique Barthélemy, ‘La Mutation féodale a-t-elle eu lieu? (note critique)’, Annales. Économies, Sociétés, 
Civilisations, vol. 47, no. 3 (1992), 767–77, and idem, La Société, esp. 19–83, 350. 
10 White, ‘Debate: “The Feudal Revolution”’, 209; Otto Brunner, “Land” and Lordship: Structures of 
Governance in Medieval Austria, trans. from 4th ed. by Howard Kaminsky and James Van Horn Melton 
(Philadelphia, 1992). 
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Guyotjeannin offered a magisterial overview of the processes whereby monastic scriptoria 
became the chief centres of eleventh-century documentary production, thus opening the door 
to interpret such texts in light of monastic discourse.11 Violence was thus reinterpreted as an 
integral component of just such a discourse — particularly that of ‘radical reform’ emanating 
from centres like Cluny, Fleury, and Marmoutier — whereby monks, in presenting 
lay/ecclesiastical relations in terms of violence, attempted to construct ideological distance 
between the sacred Ecclesia and the profane world of lordship.12 Reinterpreting violence 
within the framework of monastic discourse has been part of a larger historiographical shift 
whereby the mutation féodale thesis seems poised to be replaced by a mutation monastique.13  
 Yet, arguments treating violence as monastic discourse mostly avoid larger questions 
over the relationship between violence and eleventh-century legal institutions, which had 
occupied an earlier generation of historians. This discourse of violence is treated as though it 
were separate from those institutions. But the problem of violence continues to be a thorny 
issue, especially amidst a larger revitalisation of interest in the functioning of legal 
institutions during the central middle ages.14 Indeed, given the importance of such 
                                                          
11 Olivier Guyotjeannin, ‘“Penuria scriptorum”: le mythe de l’anarchie documentaire dans la France du Nord 
(Xe–première moitié du XIe siècle)’, Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes, vol. 155 (1997), 11–44; see also 
François Bougard, ‘Écrire le procès: le compte rendu judiciaire entre VIIIe et XIe siècle’, Médiévales, no. 56. 
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12 Florian Mazel, ‘Amitié et rupture de l’amitié. Moines et grands laïcs provençaux au temps de la crise 
grégorienne (milieu XIe–milieu XIIe siècle)’, Revue Historique, vol. 307, no. 1 (2005), 53–95, and Nicolas 
Ruffini-Ronzani and Jean-François Nieus, ‘Société seigneuriale, réformes ecclésiales: les enjeux documentaires 
d’une révision historiographique’, in Steven Vanderputten and Brigitte Meijns (eds.), Ecclesia in medio 
nationis: Reflections on the Study on Monasticism in the Central Middle Ages/Réflexions sur l’étude du 
monachism au Moyen Âge central (Leuven, 2011), 77–100. Note, however, Piotr Górecki, ‘Violence and the 
Social Order in a Medieval Society: The Evidence from the Henryków Region, ca.1150–ca.1300’, in Balázs 
Nagy and Marcell Sebók (eds.), …The Man of Many Devices, Who Wandered Full Many Ways… Festschrift in 
Honor of János M. Bak (Budapest, 1999), 91–104, for a critique against an over-emphasis on viewing violence 
as rhetoric. 
13 Florian Mazel, ‘Pouvoir aristocratique et Église aux Xe–XIe siècles. Retour sur la “Révolution féodale” dans 
l’œuvre de Georges Duby’, Médiévales, vol. 54 (2008), 137–52, and idem, ‘Monachisme et aristocratie aux Xe–
XIe siècles. Un regard sur l’historiographie récente’, in Vanderputten and Meijns (eds.), Ecclesia in medio 
nationis: Reflections on the Study on Monasticism in the Central Middle Ages, 47–75. 
14 See the important article by Jane Martindale, ‘“His Special Friend”? The Settlement of Disputes and Political 
Power in the Kingdom of the French (Tenth to Mid–Twelfth Century)’, Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society, sixth series, vol. 5 (1995), 21–57; Chris Wickham, Courts and Conflict in Twelfth-Century Tuscany 
(Oxford, 2003); Jeffrey A. Bowman, Shifting Landmarks: Property, Proof, and Dispute in Catalonia around the 
Year 1000 (Ithaca, 2004); Lemesle, Conflits et justice; Julien Maquet, “Faire justice” dans le diocèse de Liège 
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institutions, historians are left searching for an explanation as to why violence was ‘almost 
always at issue’ in surviving disputes.15 Reading violence as monastic discourse is one 
attempt to sidestep the problem, while the other has been to describe such violence in terms 
of self-help or direct action. These were practices whereby disputants used force to express 
their claims upon landed property, practices which, according to Bruno Lemesle, were 
socially legitimate and no one questioned in principle.16 Violence would only become an 
issue law courts actively sought to contain with the resurgence of royal institutions in the 
second half of the twelfth century — informed by Roman law-inspired notions of crime —
claiming to act in the public interest.17 Violence was a problem for the emerging state and its 
courts to contain, not the legal institutions of eleventh-century France. 
 Historians’ understanding of violence thus continues to be situated within a public/private 
framework, and this has seriously limited our understanding of eleventh-century courts. The 
conceptual dichotomy between private self-help on the one hand, and the public 
monopolisation (however aspirational) of the legitimate use of force on the other risks 
assuming that one of the principle functions of legal institutions is simply to limit recourse to 
violence and to punish those who use illicit force.18 If eleventh-century courts are measured 
against such criteria, then they patently failed. But this is to make two assumptions of those 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
au Moyen Âge (VIIIe–XIIe siècles). Essai de droit judiciaire reconstitué (Geneva, 2008); Hélène Couderc-
Barraud, La Violence, l’ordre et la paix. Résoudre les conflits en Gascogne du XIe au début du XIIIe siècle 
(Toulouse, 2008); and most recently Wendy Davies, Windows on Justice in Northern Iberia 800–1000 
(Abingdon, 2016). 
15 Bisson, Crisis of the Twelfth Century, 137. 
16 White, ‘Debate: The “Feudal Revolution”’, esp. 211–13; Wickham, Courts and Conflict, esp. 87–8, 277–86 
offer particularly clear analyses; note also Lemesle, Conflits et justice, 9. 
17 Bruno Lemesle, ‘Introduction’, in Bruno Lemesle and Michel Nassiet (eds.), Valeurs et justice. Écarts et 
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overview in Régine Beauthier, Droit et genèse de l’État, 4th ed. (Brussels, 2011), esp. 207–15; Alan Harding, 
Medieval Law and the Foundations of the State (Oxford, 2002); Nicole Gonthier, Le châtiment du crime au 
Moyen Âge (XIIe–XVIe siècles) (Rennes, 1998). French royal attempts to control violence in the later middle 
ages (post-1250) have been recently problematised in the excellent study of Justine Firnhaber-Baker, Violence 
and the State in Languedoc, 1250–1400 (Cambridge, 2014), and see also the collected essays in Claude 
Gauvard, Violence et ordre public au Moyen Âge (Paris, 2005). For developments in learned law concerning 
crime, see Richard Fraher, ‘The Theoretical Justification for the New Criminal Law of the High Middle Ages: 
Rei publicae interest, ne crimina remaneant impunita’, University of Illinois Law Review, vol. 3 (1984), 577–95. 
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institutions: first, that their primary rôle in the dispute process was to enforce rules 
prohibiting the use of force; and second, and more fundamentally, that the very intervention 
of such courts was motivated chiefly out of a desire to assert a monopoly over the legitimate 
use of force on behalf of the court-holder. Since there is little evidence for the enforcement of 
prohibitions against the use of force, and even less — outside the context of the Peace of 
God, at least — for ideological claims to limit the use of force at all, historians’ 
understanding of eleventh-century violence has naturally veered towards models of self-
help.19  
 Eleventh-century courts need to be viewed differently, and freed from the distorting 
effects of a perspective which remains, in essence, étatiste. This article does so by posing a 
more fundamental question of how court-holders used concepts of violence in the 
construction of authority within their courts and jurisdictions.20 Approaching the issue this 
way allows us to question why violence was a concept with legal utility in such courts, rather 
than assuming that the principle interest legal institutions had in violence was to put into 
practice ideological claims for a monopolisation on the use of force. Just such an approach 
helps further to avoid the trap of evaluating the rôle of legal institutions based on their ability 
to enforce these ideological aspirations which may or may not have existed in the first place. 
My geographical focus is on Anjou in northwestern France, a region possessing a rich 
documentary tradition; my analysis covers a ‘long’ eleventh century stretching back to c.987 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
For England, see Paul Hyams, Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England (Ithaca and London, 2003), 
which softens the effects of this transformation. 
18 Brown, Violence and Couderc-Barraud, La violence are both structured explicitly on this dichotomy. 
19 On the Peace of God, see Thomas Head and Richard Landes (eds.), The Peace of God: Social Violence and 
Religious Response in France around the Year 1000 (Ithaca, 1992), and Dominique Barthélemy, L’An mil et la 
paix de Dieu. La France chrétienne et féodale, 980–1060 (Paris, 1999) offering different perspectives. 
20 This article has found much inspiration in the work by specialists on later medieval government examining 
how control over the definition of violence was an integral component in the construction of political authority. 
This present article differs insofar as we cannot assume the state as our basis of political authority. See in 
particular Antoine Follain et al. (eds.), La Violence et le judiciaire du Moyen Âge à nos jours. Discours, 
perceptions, pratiques (Rennes, 2008); Firnhaber-Baker, Violence and the State; Alice Taylor, ‘Crime without 
Punishment: Medieval Scottish Law in Comparative Perspective’, in David Bates (ed.), Anglo-Norman Studies: 
Proceedings of the Battle Conference 2012. Volume 35 (Woodbridge, 2013), 287–304; and Laure Verdon, 
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and reaching forwards to c.1151, when Anjou became integrated into the larger political 
structures of the Angevin empire.21 
 This article will therefore make two principal claims. First, it reevaluates the relationship 
between the discourse of violence on the one hand, and eleventh-century legal institutions on 
the other, by suggesting that contemporary understandings of violence depended upon courts 
to be meaningful. This subject occupies the first two sections. Next, I address why eleventh-
century courts cultivated a particular understanding of violence. I suggest the maintenance of 
public order was not the primary ideological concern of such courts, and instead, that 
decisions made over violence represent attempts to mask legal decision-making in politically 
complex land claims. The legal framework of eleventh-century violence, then, finds an 
explanation not in any étatiste framework, but rather within the context of the internal 
structuration of newly developing proprietary jurisdictions. 
 
I 
Ecclesiastical charters resound with tales of violence.22 Take for example the case of Bernier, 
who in 1038 x 1055 aided his kinsman Guy d’Idré during the latter’s dispute with the monks 
of Saint-Aubin over land at Vaux by killing the monks’ mares, and burning down their 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Violence, norme et régulation sociale au Moyen Âge. Essai de bilan historiographique’, Rives 
méditerranéennes, vol. 40 (2011), 11–25. 
21 The political narrative of the region can be followed in: Louis Halphen, Le Comté d’Anjou au XIe siècle 
(Paris, 1906); Olivier Guillot, Le Comte d’Anjou et son entourage au XIe siècle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1972); Josèphe 
Chartrou, L'Anjou de 1109 à 1151. Foulque de Jerusalem et Geoffroi Plantegenêt (Paris, 1928); and Jacques 
Boussard, Le Comté d'Anjou sous Henri Plantegenêt et ses fils (1151–1204) (Paris, 1938). Reform in the region 
is discussed in Jean-Hervé Foulon, Église et réforme au Moyen Âge. Papauté, milieux réformateurs et 
ecclésiologie dans les Pays de la Loire au tournant des XIe–XIIe siècles (Brussels, 2008). 
22 The sources used for the present study are: Bibl. nat. de France, ms. lat. 1930, ‘Livre noir de Saint-Florent’ 
[henceforth = Livre noir]; ‘Cartae de rebus abbatiae majoris monasterii in Andegavia’, ed. Paul Marchegay, in 
Archives d’Anjou, vol. 2 (Angers, 1850) [= MMA]; Cartulaire de l’abbaye de Saint-Aubin d’Angers, 3 vols., ed. 
Bertrand de Broussillon (Angers, 1896–1903) [= SAA]; Cartulaire du chapitre Saint-Laud d’Angers, ed. Adrien 
Planchenault (Angers, 1903) [= SL]; ‘Cartularium monasterii Beatae Mariae Andegavensis’, ed. Paul 
Marchegay, in Archives d’Anjou, vol. 3 (Angers, 1854) [= RA]; Cartulaire noir de la cathédrale d’Angers, ed. 
Charles Urseau (Paris, 1908) [= CN]; ‘Cartulaire de Saint-Maur de Glanfeuil’, ed. Paul Marchegay, in Archives 
d’Anjou vol. 1 (Angers, 1843) [= SMG]; Grand cartulaire de Fontevraud, 2 vols., eds. Jean-Marc Bienvenu, 
Robert Favreau, and Georges Pons (Poitiers, 2000, 2005) [= FON]; Premier et Second livres des Cartulaires de 
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buildings.23 Because of this, Guy — not Bernier — was captured by Geoffrey Martel, count 
of Anjou (1040–1060), and handed over to Abbot Gautier de Saint-Aubin, to whom he paid 
compensation for the mares and houses, and abandoned his claim upon the land.24 That Guy 
along with his mother obtained a life-interest in half this estate following the outcome of the 
case hints at a more complex underlying normative issue, but nevertheless, the focus on 
violence, both to structure the monks’ complaint and to engage legal procedures, remains 
striking.25   
 Saint-Aubin’s complaint against Guy and Bernier is just one of approximately 255 cases 
from Anjou in which disputants accused their adversaries of committing acts of violence in 
the course of property disputes.26 This violence was described evocatively at times, like when 
Hubert de Durtal and his men beat the canons of Saint-Maurice and burned down their chapel 
in the woodland of Chambiers; or when Boso and Raoul broke into mills belonging to the 
nuns of Fontevraud and stole grain and cheese (caseos).27 More often, violence appears only 
in generic terms, emerging out of a broad linguistic register — a discourse of violentia. 
Deeds, sometimes ‘wicked deeds’ (mala), were done ‘violently’ (violenter), ‘by violence’ 
(per violentiam), ‘by force’ (per vim or per forciam), or ‘with force and rapine’ (vi et 
rapina);28 and actions were described in verbs which implied force, such as to assault 
(assalire), to attack (aggredi), to damage (dampnare or dampna inferre), to extort 
(extorquere), to harass (inquietare), to injure (injuriare), to molest (molestare), to occupy 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
l’abbaye Saint-Serge et Saint-Bach d’Angers (XIe et XIIe siècles), 2 vols., ed. Yves Chauvin (Angers, 1997) [= 
SSE]. All references are to charter numbers, with the exception of Livre noir, which refers to folio numbers. 
23 SAA 939. 
24 SAA 940 fleshes out some of the details of this case. 
25 Guy’s was a hereditary claim upon land that had been given to his ancestors as a life-grant. On the difficulties 
arising from ecclesiastical institutions attempting to reclaim control over lands given out as life-grants, see 
Bruno Lemesle, ‘Les Querelles avaient-elles une vocation sociale? Le cas des transferts fonciers en Anjou au 
XIe siècle’, Le Moyen Âge, vol. 115 (2009), 337–64. 
26 This figure is drawn from the sources listed above, n. 22, and covers the period c.987 to c.1151. 
27 SSE i, 143 (1098x 1100); FON 250 (1118 x 1129). 
28 For mala, see: RA 176 (1067 x 1076), SSE i 165 (c.1090); violenter: CN 231 (1136 x 1148), Livre noir 58r–
59v (1067), Livre noir 111v–112r, SAA 790 (c.1111), RA 182 (c.1106), RA 332 (c.1115), SAA 900 (c.1087), SL 5 
(c.1111), SL 44 (1103); per violentiam: FON 637 (1129), SAA 674 (1142), SSE ii [8] 71 (1069 x 1093); per vim: 
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(occupare), to oppress (opprimere), to seize (invadere, rapere, or abferre), to usurp 
(usurpare), to vex (vexare), or to weary (fatigare).29  
 Some immediate questions present themselves: are all these words part of a broader 
lexical category of violentia, and do they necessarily mean force — or violence — in its 
modern understanding? Bruno Lemesle, for instance, has suggested that violentia and its 
cognates refers to ‘injustice’ or ‘illegality’, rather than force; a ‘violent’ action in eleventh-
century understanding was one done without a solid basis in right.30 Without anticipating my 
argument too much, however, a major trend is visible from the evidence discussed in this 
paper. Contemporaries developed an expansive understanding of violentia within the shadow 
of legal institutions, which shaped the interpretation of social practice. They further displayed 
an increasing interest in the smaller details which helped them to interpret actions as violent, 
in our sense. Seizing goods ‘at night’, entering property with a ‘drawn sword’, committing 
deeds ‘by force’: all aimed at anchoring social practices more concretely within the 
conceptually broad notion of violentia developing in the legal sphere. None of this need 
necessarily mean violence in our modern sense: but what matters is that contemporaries 
seized upon the opportunity to situate complex social practices within a definite set of 
meanings which presupposed the use of force.31 My interest in this article lies in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Livre noir 24v–25r (986 x 994), Livre noir 25r-v (986 x 1005), RA 98 (c.1120), SAA 372 (1082 x 1106); per 
forciam: SAA 90 (1067 x 1081), SAA 167 (c.1060); vi et rapina: SAA 151 (c.1140), SL 19 (1109). 
29 Assalire: SAA 220 (1067 x 1081); aggredi: SAA 181 (1067 x 1082), SAA 430 (1113); dampnare: SAA 220; 
dampna inferre: SSE i 194/5 (1083), SSE ii [72] 125 (1080s); extorquere: SAA 674 (1142); inquietare: FON 457 
(1145), SAA 144 (1107 x 1119); injuriare: CN 82 (1116), Livre noir 108v–109r (c.1070); invadere: CN 157 
(1102 x 1125), RA 240 (1050 x 1055), RA 432 (c.1063), SAA 374 (1067 x 1109), SSE ii [57] 51 (1067 x 1081); 
molestare: FON 402 (1125 x 1130), SSE i 37 (1060 x 1068); occupare: CN 224 (1125 x 1148), SAA 180 (1075), 
SSE ii [2] 307 (1062 x 1082); opprimere: SAA 151 (c.1140), SAA 220; rapere: FON 250 (1118 x 1129), RA 50 
(c.1115), RA 221 (c.1095), SAA 325 (1102), SL 5 (c.1111); abferre: Livre noir 56r (c.1060), Livre noir 104r 
(1058 x 1060), SAA 632 (1100 x 1102), SAA 706 (1082 x 1138), SL 19 (1109), SL 55 (1104), SSE i 6 (1082 x 
1093); usurpare: Livre noir 79v–80v (1061 x 1070), SAA 217 (1056 x 1060), SAA 222 (1087); vexare: SAA 640 
(1106), SSE ii [101] 219 (1138 x 1150); fatigare: SSE ii [53] 350 (1093 x 1102). 
30 Bruno Lemesle, Michel Nassiet, and Pascale Quincy-Lefebvre, ‘Introduction’, in Follain et al., La Violence et 
le judiciaire, esp. 12–14. Note also Thomas Roche, ‘The Diplomatics of Depredation: Reconsidering Holy 
Trinity Caen’s List of Losses’, in Laura L. Gathagan and William North (eds.), Haskins Society Journal 26 
2014. Studies in Medieval History (Woodbridge, 2015), 128–9, 135–6.  
31 Note here the stimulating comments in Gadi Algazi, ‘Pruning Peasants: Private War and Maintaining the 
Lord's Peace in Late Medieval Germany’, in Cohen and De Jong (eds.), Medieval Transformations, 260.  
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presentation of social action as if it involved force, regardless of whether the underlying 
social practices were actually violent.  
 Since accounts of violentia survive in ecclesiastical charters, they have been treated with 
a fair amount of skepticism by historians. Charters are partisan texts, written by ecclesiastics 
who were themselves party to the events they described — they were produced at an 
immediate remove from the perspective of the lay actors they describe.  Moreover, charters 
and their accounts of violentia were written in Latin, as opposed to the vernacular of the lay 
world, creating even greater distance between the world of the texts and that beyond them. 
Together, these features of ecclesiastical charters have made historians doubt the extent to 
which such documentation can provide access to wider norms and values of lay society.32 Not 
surprisingly, problems of source criticism have contributed to the current consensus that 
violentia was a discourse motivated principally by the internal concerns of reforming 
churchmen.  
 It would be rash, however, to dismiss ecclesiastical complaints of violentia without first 
understanding how to place them in relation to legal processes, or how they acquired meaning 
as a form of discourse. The violentia of the charters arose from the very real business of 
formulating legal accusations: violentia is the language of complaint. Such language often 
appears in connection with descriptions that plaintiffs made an accusation (clamor) to an 
individual with the authority to convene a court and provide justice.33 Take the following 
example: around 1060 Geoffrey Advise and Mainard de Liniers ‘usurped’ (usurpaverunt) a 
mill belonging to Saint-Florent de Saumur, whence the monks made a plaint (clamor) to Guy 
                                                          
32 See in particular the magisterial Susan Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted 
(Oxford, 1994), for an especially skeptical view. 
33 See Richard E. Barton, ‘Making a Clamor to the Lord: Noise, Justice and Power in Eleventh- and Twelfth-
Century France’, in Belle S. Tuten and Tracey L. Billado (eds.), Feud, Violence and Practice: Essays in 
Medieval Studies in Honor of Stephen D. White (Farnham, 2010), 213–35; Bongert, Recherches, 186–9 remains 
useful. 
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de Vaucouleurs.34 The association between violentia and accusations brought to court-holders 
appears frequently, and is a pattern which remains true during the entire period under 
consideration in this article.35 This is an obvious point — and it should be — but it is 
important to underline that there is a recurring emphasis on violentia and the process of 
seeking justice from those with the authority to convene courts.36 
 Litigation was accusatorial, and plaints exercised a vital rôle in structuring proceedings. 
Accusations might, at times, have been made in informal circumstances, such as when Robert 
Borellus burst into the parlour of the bishop of Angers to denounce the abbot of Saint-Aubin 
and his monks as thieves (raptores).37 But it is necessary to distinguish initial plaints, which 
may display elements of informality, from the formal counts which opened a trial.38 Lambert 
son of Martin, for instance, between 1050 and 1070, brought a number of plaints to various 
officials of Saint-Florent which convinced them, eventually, to gather a court before the 
abbot: Lambert was given a fixed date and told, ‘tomorrow, or the day after, you will be 
prepared to make your plaint (clamor) over this challenge in the presence of the lord abbot.’39 
The procedural accusation is foundational to our understanding of violentia because this 
language needs to be interpreted with the rhythm of litigation always firmly in mind.  
 We do, in fact, have documents which are compilations of plaints brought to the attention 
of a court-holder. The purpose of such texts (I shall refer to them as querimoniae) was to 
gather a list of accusations in advance of formal proceedings, to serve as an aide-mémoire 
                                                          
34 Livre noir 56r. 
35 See inter alia: CN 153 (1122 x 1123), CN 207 (1136 x 1148), FON 376 (1123 x 1148), FON 637 (1129), 
Livre noir 26v (c.1000), Livre noir 56r (c.1060), Livre noir 107r-v (c.1070), RA 183 (1150 x 1154), RA 194 
(c.1115), RA 282 (c.1090), RA 283 (c.1090), SAA 644 (1140), SAA 932 (1129), SAA 949 (1151), SSE i 201 
(1069 x 1081), SSE ii [8] 71 (1069 x 1093), SSE ii [84] 171 (1100 x 1150). 
36 Note also Barton, ‘Making a Clamor’, 224, 226. 
37 SAA 112 (1100). 
38 Vernacular literature provides a useful framework for thinking about trial procedure, on which see the still 
classic Paul Hyams, ‘Henry II and Ganelon’, Syracuse Scholar, vol. 4 (1983), 22–35, and R. Howard Bloch, 
Medieval French Literature and Law (Berkeley, 1977). 
39 Livre noir 112r-v. 
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when pleading.40 Saint-Aubin’s celebrated querimoniae about their priory at Méron, 
produced sometime before 1081, records some twenty-two separate accusations made against 
Renault, lord of Montreuil-Bellay, and his agents, ranging from seizures of moveables and 
cash, alleged abuses of justice, the destruction of livestock, and low-level thuggery directed 
towards the peasantry.41 The nuns of Le Ronceray similarly produced a list of querimoniae 
against Hugh de Juvardeil and his men.42 Of the nine recorded accusations, five were against 
Hugh himself, and included: (i) the seizure and ransom of one Raoul for 40s., (ii) the theft 
(from Raoul, again) of two oxen worth 50s., and rapine against his land valuing 25s., (iii) the 
collection of renders per violentiam from land of Le Ronceray, (iv) compulsion of monastic 
dependents to ride in his patrols (equitaturas), and (v) the compulsion of these same men to 
use the mill in his castle. The complaints against his men told a similar story: Fraaudus Bos, 
vicarius, stole oxen from one Ranier; Landric broke into an estate (fregit quandam domum) to 
steal two oxen; Lambert, an arms-bearer (armiger), orchestrated the nocturnal theft of 
Renault Bordel’s pigs; and Garnier took oxen from one Bernard Barre.  
 If ecclesiastical charters record violentia often at a considerable remove from lived legal 
experience, the querimoniae are valuable because they are one step closer to actual legal 
practice. Although they still do not preserve the spoken words of real, vernacular accusations, 
the plaints they record nevertheless reflect a less ‘worked up’ understanding of violentia. In 
these texts, scribes sought to express violence in ways designed to be more immediately 
accessible to the curial contexts where plaintiffs sought justice.  
                                                          
40 Such texts are comparable to Catalan queriomoniae on which see Blanca Garí, ‘Las querimoniae feudales en 
la documentación catalana del siglo XII (1131–1178)’, Medievalia V (1984), 7–49, and Thomas N. Bisson, 
Tormented Voices: Power, Crisis, and Humanity in Rural Catalonia, 1140–1200 (Cambridge [MA], 1998). On 
the use of documents in Angevin courts preparatory to pleading, see Dominique Barthélemy, ‘Une Crise de 
l’écrit? Observations sur des actes de Saint-Aubin d’Angers (XIe siècle)’, Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes, 
vol. 155 (1997), 95–117. 
41 SAA 220 (1067 x 1081). On this dispute, see Lemesle, Conflits et justice, 123–38; cf. Bisson, Crisis of the 
Twelfth-Century, 136–42. 
42 RA 246. 
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 Querimoniae therefore provide a helpful way of thinking about the language of violentia 
more broadly: violentia functioned like a palimpsest, for underneath the glitz and glamour of 
ecclesiastical rhetoric lie the more banal records of legal accusations. Take the plaint made 
against Eudes de Sermaise and Bouchard by the monks of Saint-Aubin: ‘stirred by the spirit 
of iniquity, they cut down trees from the monks’ land, and carried the chopped wood 
home.’43 The charter draftsman further described Eudes and Bouchard as ‘filled with 
contempt’, and opened his text with a proem alluding to Matt. 24:12 decrying the ever-
increasing abundance of iniquity in the world. Saint-Aubin’s account is a self-confident, 
rhetorically stylised text, and may have been written partly out of a desire to take pride in the 
monastic victory which followed Eudes’ and Bouchard’s actions.44 But beneath the layers of 
this rhetorical craftsmanship lies a core substantive plaint: entry into monastic property, 
seizure of resources in that land, and the removal of said resources. 
 The stories disputants brought to court-holders were organised around a finite number of 
themes, and violentia provided one of the core substantive issues around which to construct a 
legal claim.45 Indeed, one Saint-Aubin charter stated expressly that whenever a plaint was 
made by laymen against the monks or their dependents, the appellant was to specify the 
offence for which the defendant was impleaded.46 There are, additionally, many charters in 
which laymen and ecclesiastics agreed that if some offence should occur, the lay lord would 
first make a plaint (clamor) prior to the exercise of distraint — that is, the seizure of goods 
aimed at compelling attendance at court or making up the loss caused by the initial offence.47 
Take for instance the agreement between the monks of Saint-Florent and Guy de 
                                                          
43 SAA 270 (1080s). 
44 Lemesle, Conflits et justice, 31, on self-congratulation as a motive for the production of dispute charters. 
45 See here John Hudson, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Volume II: 871–1216 (Oxford, 2012), 70, 
307–8, who distinguishes claims that a wrong had been done to the claimant from claims that the defendant had 
property belonging to the claimant. The distinction is foundational, and is unlikely to have been understood 
differently in northern France. 
46 SAA 226 (1055 x 1093); see also Bongert, Recherches, 188. 
47 On this type of violence connected to the operation of legal processes, see in particular John Hudson, Land, 
Law and Lordship in Anglo-Norman England (Oxford, 1994), 22–51. 
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Vaucouleurs, formed around 1070, whereby Guy promised that ‘his vicarius may never enter 
the aforesaid land in order to do justice, but may instead make a plaint (clamor) to the monk 
[living there], and he [the monk] will distrain (distringat) his own serfs (villanos) in pursuit 
of justice (justiciam faciendo).’48 Such provisions appear in charters from about the 1040s, 
and encouraged would-be litigants to construct specific claims for which they sought 
justice.49 There are even cases where courts judged against defendants because they had not 
made such a clamor prior to the taking of distraint; and accusations were also made that the 
defendant had used force sine clamore or sine judicio.50 Not only did such provisions mean 
that the use of force prior to making a complaint was itself an actionable wrong, but they also 
reveal a broader trend towards specificity in the formulation of legal complaints.   
 This is why when clamores touched on violentia, they can so often be reduced to a 
number of common elements. Le Ronceray’s querimoniae against Hugh de Juvardeil, for 
instance, almost all took the form of an accusation of theft/forceful seizure. The verb abferre 
(to seize) was used in three accusations, accipere (to take) twice, and furari (to steal) once. 
Plaints likewise display a specificity in value: Hugh stole oxen worth 50s., and committed 
rapine valued at 25s. In the Méron querimoniae, Renault’s vicarius Calvin wrongfully 
obtained a total of 147s. These plaints also display an attention to circumstantial detail, 
hinting at increasing specificity and an interest in actual force. Lambert, the man of Hugh de 
Juvardeil, committed his theft at night (noctu); Landric, another of Hugh’s men, broke into an 
estate to steal oxen; Renault’s man Baldwin likewise plundered victims at night; and this 
                                                          
48 Livre noir 55v: ut vicarius ejus in jam dictam terram nequaquam ingrediatur justiciam facturus, sed clamorem 
ad monachum faciat et ipse suos villanos justiciam faciendo distringat. 
49 For further examples, see: Livre noir 95r-v (c.1040), RA 206 (c.1110), SAA 233 (c.1087), SSE i 151 (1056 x 
1082), SSE i 315 (1056 x 1082), SSE ii [41] 357 (1056 x 1082), SSE ii [97] 202 (1113 x 1133). Though cf. 
earlier clauses of immunity, on which these eleventh-century clauses may have been modelled; on the earlier 
immunity, see Barbara Rosenwein, Negotiating Space: Power, Restraint, and Privileges of Immunity in Early 
Medieval Europe (Ithaca, 1999). 
50 For cases, see: CN 207 (1136 x 1148), MMA [pp.] 45–7 (c.1120), RA 13 (1147), RA 367 (c.1110), SAA 178 
(1056 x 1060), SAA 325 (1102), SL 60 (c.1142). See also Barton, ‘Making a Clamor’, esp. 229–32. The phrase 
sine judicio would lie at the heart of novel disseisin cases in Angevin England, on which see Hudson, Oxford 
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same Baldwin entered a monastic estate with a drawn sword (gladio evaginato).51 Nor is this 
specificity limited to the querimoniae-style documents. In 1006 x 1039, for instance, the 
ministri of Fulk Nerra entered an episcopal house in Angers and stole the basin used for 
washing episcopal vestments because they thought the house was unoccupied. The bishop of 
Angers, Hubert de Vendôme, then made a clamor to Fulk specifically ‘over the invasion 
(infractione) of his washing house, and over the stolen basin.’52  
 This is more than rhetoric intended only for internal, ecclesiastical consumption. 
Appellants’ complaints instantiated the abstract jurisdictional claims of court-holders, a 
jurisdiction which was ordinarily expressed as justice over the four offences or forisfacta: 
homicide/bloodshed, rape, arson, and theft. Such statements are found in charters where a 
lord — often the count, but not necessarily so — reserved the right to hear cases pertaining to 
these four forisfacta.53 The forisfacta covered types of actionable wrong by which plaintiffs 
could structure their accusations: wider notions of jurisdiction provided, in a sense, scripts 
when it came to seeking justice from a court-holder. That a symmetry existed between 
clamor and forisfacta can be seen most clearly in cases where plaintiffs used the language of 
forisfacta, like in 1070 x 1090 when the monks of Saint-Florent complained simply that 
Haimo had committed ‘many forisfacta’ against them.54 Likewise, adversaries’ actions were 
sometimes expressed with the verb forisfacere, a verb built around the latent jurisdictional 
ideas contained in the notion of the forisfacta.55 One of the ways in which violentia worked 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
History of the Laws of England, 609–14, and 611 for sine judicio; and Donald W. Sutherland, The Assize of 
Novel Disseisin (Oxford, 1973), esp. 26. 
51 RA 246, SAA 220. On the sorts of circumstantial detail that contributed to notions of theft, see in particular 
Valérie Toureille, Vol et brigandage au Moyen Âge (Paris, 2006). 
52 CN 80. In a sense, the text is better read as two accusations. 
53 Comital grants: see FON 168 (1116 x 1125), FON 868 (1135), Livre noir 125v–126r (1060 x 1067), SAA 864 
(1151). For non-comital grants, see RA 208 (c.1115), SAA 221 (1082), SAA 226 (1055 x 1093), and SAA 919 
(1087), for a gift of two thirds of ‘blood spilt’ (sanguinis). Not every example of such jurisdiction mentions all 
four offences. Note Lemesle, Conflits, 81. 
54 Livre noir 72r. See also: Livre noir 117v–118r (1060 x 1070), RA 221 (c.1095), SAA 7 (1067 x 1070), SAA 105 
(1080 x 1106), SAA 216 (1060 x 1067), SSE i 143 (1098 x 1100). 
55 Forisfacere: SAA 89 (1067 x 1098), SAA 178 (1056 x 1059).  
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as a discourse was to help channel plaints towards one of the forisfacta — a point I shall 
return to shortly.  
 When ecclesiastical scribes labelled their adversaries thieves (latrones, fures), accused 
them of theft (furtum), complained of robbery (latrocinium) or rapine (rapina), or alleged 
their opponents had entered ecclesiastical lands by violence (per violentiam) or with force 
(vis), they were thus situating their interpretation of these actions explicitly within the 
framework of wider views of jurisdiction.56 There was an intrinsic logic to the language of 
violentia which sought to bridge the gap between the self-proclaimed victim’s perspective, 
and that of the external legal world in which ecclesiastical actors operated. This helps 
reorientate our approach to the more generic terms within the discourse of violentia, and a 
consideration of the range of verbs employed in accusations is revealing. Out of a total 273 
complaints, 222 use a verb to evoke violentia.57 The most common verb by far is ab/auferre, 
implying theft, appearing in seventy-eight of the plaints (35%); other theft-like verbs, such as 
abstrahere, subripere, absportare, and, of course, furari, appear in a total of eighteen plaints 
(8%). The other most common category is verbs expressing violent seizure: invadere alone 
appears in twenty-three plaints (10%), whilst similar verbs (rapere, pervadere) figure in 
twelve complaints (5%). Whilst this evidence cannot be pushed too far, the pattern is clear, 
and suggests a conceptual relationship whereby violentia in ecclesiastical charters was 
associated above-all with ideas implying theft or the violent seizure of property.  
 The world of accusations provides, therefore, a helpful tool in thinking about how to get 
from the generic violentia of the charters towards the real substance of eleventh-century 
litigation before court-holders. Charters were the product of a dialectic between legal 
                                                          
56 For latrones or fures, see: SAA 220 (1067 x 1081), SAA 226 (1055 x 1093); for furtum, see: SAA 430 (1113); 
for latrocinium: RA 51 (c.1109), SAA 220; for rapina, see: Livre noir 119r-v (c.1060), RA 380 (c.1110); for per 
violentiam, see above, n. 27. 
57 The discrepancy between the number of plaints (273) and the number of disputes (255) is explained by the 
fact that some disputes contain multiple accusations against different individuals, as in the querimoniae 
documents. 
  17 
procedures and the representation of those procedures, and at heart here was the legal plaint.58 
Although this was an oral procedure, its echoes reverberate in ecclesiastical charters: 
however indirectly such plaints are preserved in these charters, they nevertheless point 
outwards to a world beyond the text. The language of violentia cannot be explained 
exclusively in terms of ecclesiastical rhetoric intended for internal consumption. 
 
II 
Accusations need not reflect a literal understanding of events in terms of theft or another of 
the forisfacta. Plumes of smoke or mounds of smouldering ash no doubt made accusations of 
arson unambiguous, yet when it came to theft, litigants possessed considerable interpretative 
wiggle-room as to whether or not any given act was actually theft.59 The accumulation of 
circumstantial details to complaints of theft hints at the conscious attempt to present the facts 
of the case in as negative a light as possible, but many complaints of violentia were recorded 
simply as so-and-so ‘seized’ (abstulit) land, woodland, mills or some other object.60 The 
meaning of such phrases is far from clear and must have in many instances required an act of 
doublethink to be understood literally as theft. Eleventh-century litigants were not fools. 
Instead, it was the potential for accusations to be flexibly mapped onto categories of 
actionable wrong that mattered, however tenuous this mental cartography may seem. 
Violentia was an intrinsically malleable discourse which could be moulded to appeal to a 
particular logic of jurisdiction.  
 There are cases demonstrating litigants’ conscious efforts to make their plaints fit this 
jurisdiction. The nuns of Le Ronceray, around 1110 for instance, found themselves in court 
                                                          
58 See in particular Lemesle, Conflits, esp. 213–46 and Wickham, Courts and Conflicts on this dialectic process. 
59 For arson, see: SAA 663 (1151), SAA 939 (1038 x 1055), SL 19 (1109), SSE i 143 (1098 x 1100). 
60 Land: CN 52 (1040 x 1080), Livre noir 26v–27v (987 x 1011), SSE ii [2] 312 (1093 x 1113), SSE ii [87] 171 
(1100 x 1150); woodland: SSE i 207 (1056 x 1082); mills: Livre noir 119r-v (c.1060). Accusations of theft or 
rapine over tithes or the fish from fishing weirs, for instance, make more immediate sense: SSE ii [17] 39 (1100 
x 1110), SSE ii [74] 128 (1138 x 1150), and for the fishing weir, see MMA, [pp.] 17–18 (1070 x 1080). 
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before Count Fulk V (1109–1129) because their steward, Barbot, had seized and discarded 
loaves of bread when a number of bakers attempted to sell them in a market where the right 
to such sales was exclusive to the nuns. Upon seeing their wares maltreated, the bakers made 
a plaint (clamor) to William des Moulins, a comital prévôt, over Barbot’s actions; William 
then ‘accused Barbot and wished to implead him about the seizure [of bread] as if it were a 
forifactum’ (et cum Guillermus accusaret Barbotum et vellet inde causari de invasione quasi 
de forifacto).61 At court, Fulk V upheld the nuns’ monopoly and Barbot, presumably, was off 
the hook. From the nuns’ perspective, Barbot’s actions were entirely just since he was simply 
defending the interests of his lord, the community of Le Ronceray: this was patently not a 
forisfactum — nor, for that matter, was it violence. But, that an ecclesiastical adversary 
sought to present these actions as if they did constitute a forisfactum, as if violence had 
occured, is an important indication of how contemporaries consciously structured and 
presented their plaints. Barbot’s case is exceptionally clear in this regard, though many other 
cases in which plaintiffs concentrated on the facts of violentia point in the same direction.62   
 The presentation of cases ‘as if’ they pertained to a specific category of claim casts light 
on the basic structures of eleventh-century legal thought. Litigants emphasised particular 
facts in the construction their cases to have their plea fall under a specific set of rules 
governing violent wrongs.63 An emphasis on violentia may, in part, have been motivated by a 
desire to engage procedures and forms of redress appropriate to the appellant’s type of 
                                                          
61 RA 60. 
62 For similar plaints that an adversaries’ actions were ‘like’ or ‘as if’ an offence, see RA 51 (c.1109), for an 
accusation by the nuns of Le Ronceray against the monks of Saint-Nicolas, ‘who attempted to steal their parish 
as if by theft (furtim) and robbery (latrocinium).’ For the context of this parish dispute, see Belle S. Tuten, 
‘Disputing Corpses: Le Ronceray d’Angers versus Saint-Nicolas d’Angers, 1080–1145’, Medieval Perspectives, 
no. 10 (1995), 178–88. 
63 On ‘juridical qualification’ of facts in cases, see in particular, John Hudson, ‘Court Cases and Legal 
Argument in England, c.1066–1166’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, sixth series, vol. 10 (2000), 
91–115, and Lemesle, Conflits et justice, 83–121, esp. 85–8. From a more theoretical perspective, Yann 
Thomas, ‘Présentation’, Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, no. 6 (2002), 1425–28, and Olivier Cayla, ‘La 
Qualification ou la vérité du droit’, Droits, vol. 18 (1994), 3–18. 
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claim.64 Evidence of fines and damages in court cases offers one profitable route into these 
issues.65 The ability to impose fines and/or pecuniary redress was inextricable from notions 
of jurisdiction, with some charters describing a court-holder’s jurisdiction over the forisfacta 
simply as the right to try 60s. offences.66 Compensation and penalites amounted to one 
possible procedural consequence of successfully accusing an opponent of violentia. Although 
claims for such compensation, whether owed to courts or plaintiffs, were at times forgiven, 
and this could form an important element of the peace-making process, this was a far from 
universal rule.67 Many cases do in fact show defendants making payments (emendare, 
vadiare) or offering pledges that they will make appropriate material satisfaction by a fixed 
date.68 The appearance of fines and damages in court cases suggests that appellants had 
successfully convinced the court-holder to act on a plea concerning violentia — to present 
their claim in such a way that it was actionable within a jurisdictional framework focused on 
violent wrongs. 
 The discourse of violentia was an attempt to isolate a particular set of facts that were 
subject to recognisable legal rules over the treatment of violent wrongs, irrespective of and 
often in explicit opposition to the wider land claims in any dispute. Take the following 
example: in 1082 x 1101, Rouald de Luigné claimed land possessed by the monks of Saint-
Aubin was his by right, and in making his claim, he seized (invadere) the contested land. The 
case eventually entered the court of the bishop of Angers, and the scribe recounted the action 
                                                          
64 Note here Hudson, Oxford History of the Laws of England, 70. 
65 Most of the evidence deals with damages to which the (successful) appellant was entitled, rather than fine 
owed to the court-holder. Court-holders, however, seem to have set the amount of damages. 
66 For example, CN 56 (1092), Livre noir 96v (1060 x 1067), RA 5 (1040). See Julius Goebel, Felony and 
Misdemeanor: A Study in the History of Criminal Law (New York, 1937, reprint with introduction by Edward 
Peters, Philadelphia, 1976), 208–10, esp. 208, n. 43. 
67 Stephen D. White, ‘“Pactum…Legem Vincit et Amor Judicium” — The Settlement of Disputes by 
Compromise in Eleventh-Century Western France’, The American Journal of Legal History, vol. 22, no. 4 
(1978), 297; and Bruno Lemesle, ‘“Ils donnèrent leur accord à ce jugement.” Réflexions sur la contrainte 
judiciaire (Anjou, XIe–XIIe siècle)’, in La Justice en l’an mil, 136–8. 
68 See inter alia: FON 42 (1108 x 1113), Livre noir 25r-v (986 x 1005), Livre noir 28r-v (990 x 1011), RA 152 
(c.1100 x 1115), RA 221 (c.1095), RA 247 (c.1110), RA 259 (c.1110), SAA 178 (1056 x 1059), SSE ii [102] 222 
(1123 x 1148). Note also the mini-essay in Goebel, Felony and Misdemeanor, 225–7, n. 73. 
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as follows: ‘The abbot and the monks first made a plaint (clamor) over the unjust seizure 
(injusta invasione) of their possession, but Rouald said that he would give no response to 
those things (ad illa) unless first the bishop would promise to do right to him concerning the 
abbot and the monks.’69 A similar separation of claims appears in a case involving one 
Roscelin and the monks of Saint-Maur de Glanfeuil in 1086 x 1089.70 Roscelin had a land 
claim against the abbot, but whilst he awaited a date to plead in court, his brothers seized 
oxen from the contested land, whereupon the prior (not the abbot) of Saint-Maur fixed a 
court-date with the brothers in the court of Montreuil-Bellay for the seized oxen. Meanwhile, 
Roscelin again inquired with the abbot about the land claim, and was told that he could attend 
the court-date arranged by the prior where he and his brothers could plead over the land and 
the seized oxen. Roscelin seems to have been concerned that his land claim would be 
swallowed up by the abbey’s accusation that they had suffered a violent wrong. His response, 
therefore, was as follows: ‘I shall plead for myself alone, and in no way have anything to do 
with my brothers.’71 
 The distinction here is between claims for land (or rights in land) and accusations of 
violent wrong. The reasoning stands as an attempt by one party to ensure that the court 
focused on the violent wrong, rather than the land claim. The expectation on the part of the 
ecclesiastical plaintiffs was that the emphasis on violentia would have a significant effect on 
the type of case presented to the court. Complaining to court-holders about violent wrongs 
was a worthwhile exercise for plaintiffs, working full well in the expectation that such a 
plaint could substantially alter the course of the trial. Violence against property served as an 
actionable wrong in its own right; part of the rationale which gave this force was its quasi-
criminal appearance deriving from the basic jurisdictional framework outlined above. But 
what is vital to recognise is that plaintiffs (and by implication, court-holders) were 
                                                          
69 SAA 203. Cf. Barton, ‘Making a Clamor’, 228–9 for an alternative reading of this case. 
70 SMG 32. Lemesle, Conflits et justice, 66–8 gives an extended discussion of aspects of this case. 
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distinguishing land claims from accusations denouncing the actions undertaken by parties in 
pursuit of those very claims. Violent wrongs against property were separable from the wider 
legal questions of any particular dispute. 
 Similar considerations are seen in a complex case from the early 1080s. Bouchard, son of 
Guérin, and Eudes de Sermaise were accused by the monks of Saint-Aubin of entering 
monastic land, chopping down two oak trees, and carting off the chopped wood.72 In the 
court of Roger de Montrevault, judgment went against Bouchard only, and he was ordered to 
pay 30s. in damages to the abbot of Saint-Aubin. Bouchard then humbly asked for a 
remission of this debt, which Abbot Gérard granted him, saving 2s. What the charter 
draftsman here does say is that Bouchard had a land claim upon the woodland. His father had 
held rights in this woodland as the vicarius of Thibaud de Jarzé earlier in the 1060s when 
Thibaud gave the property to Saint-Aubin, compensating Guérin with 10s. to abandon his 
share.73 Bouchard’s claim was for his inheritance, then, but the charter keeps mum on this 
important point. Instead, the narrative of the case emphasises violence: entry into monastic 
land, chopping down wood, and taking the cuttings away. Before the violence, however, 
Bouchard and Eudes were confronted at the woodland by Adenor de Jarzé, wife of the 
original donor of the property, along with a band of men. Adenor offered to deal with the 
case in court, and reportedly said: ‘I shall have lord Roger – your lord too! – hold a just 
judgment between you and the monks of Saint-Aubin when he first arrives, for it falls to him 
to judge that which requires judgment.’74 The offer was spurned, and Bouchard and Eudes 
proceeded to commit the wrongs they were accused of, not before leaving a number of 
Adenor’s men wounded or slain for good measure. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
71 SMG 32. 
72 SAA 270. Note above, 0000–0000, on this case.  
73 SAA 269 (1060 x 1067). 
74 SAA 270. 
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 Two points stand out from this case. First, the silence on Bouchard’s land claim is 
matched only by the resounding focus on violentia. The charter draftsman repeats twice the 
nature of Bouchard’s wrong: entry into monastic land, chopping down trees, and carrying 
chopped wood away. Moreover, the violentia presented to the court is manifestly that against 
property: Bouchard was ordered to pay 30s. for the two oak trees, while Adenor’s wounded 
and slain men seem unimportant to the judgment. Second, the case hints that the presentation 
of a case as one of wrongdoing was connected to the legitimacy of the court-holder. Adenor’s 
fictional speech — ‘it pertains to him to judge that which requires judgment’ — is an 
unequivocal affirmation of the legitimacy of Roger’s right to judge, and that such a statement 
was even made suggests legitimacy was itself in question.75 Given the narrative focus on 
violentia, it is reasonable to suggest that having a court judge on issues of violentia somehow 
helped in constructing the legitimacy of seigneurial justice. 
 The explicit link drawn between the emphasis on violentia and the authority of the court-
holder to judge on matters of violence is striking, and reminds us of an important, though 
often overlooked, fact: ecclesiastical plaints of wrongdoing would have been meaningless had 
contemporary legal institutions not been willing to hear those claims in the first place. The 
discourse of violentia is the product of a dialectical relationship between litigant and court-
holder. Litigants selected the line of argument they thought most likely to succeed, but 
perceptions of the likelihood of success were limited by what court-holders would, in fact, 
do. When someone like Roger de Montrevault gathered his court to judge on a matter of 
wrongdoing, he provided feedback onto the wider arena of litigant strategy: violentia as a 
form of plaint worked.76 The decisions of court-holders ossified patterns of litigant behaviour 
                                                          
75 The immediate cause was likely due to the fact that Roger had wed Adenor’s daughter, Agnes, thus giving 
him a vested interest in maintaining the Jarzé family’s monastic patronage. See SSE i 180 (1057 x 1081) for the 
marriage. 
76 This point has benefitted from Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and 
Indigenous Law’, Journal of Legal Pluralism, vol. 19, no. 1 (1981), esp. 2–17 on describing the ‘centrifugal’ 
function of courts in disseminating strategies and knowledge of legal behaviours. Two especially useful 
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and argument, and by pronouncing judgment on a matter of violence, they enhanced in the 
minds of litigants the likelihood that a similar strategy, in similar circumstances, may work.77  
 That court-holders possessed agency in giving shape to contemporary legal argument 
comes across with especial clarity in cases where litigants’ attempts to isolate violentia as a 
substantive issue failed to convince the court-holder. The abbot of Saint-Aubin in 1113, for 
example, went to Hubert de Durtal to complain that Maurice, one of Hubert’s men, had stolen 
(furto aggressus) monastic possessions (res), cut-down vineyards, set-fire to monastic 
buildings including mills, and ‘inflicted upon the monks a great many other things just as 
harmful.’78 Maurice’s actions were undertaken in pursuit of a land claim against the monks 
— he claimed the inheritance of his uncle who had once been a steward of Saint-Aubin — 
and this is important in understanding Hubert’s response to the abbot’s plaint.79 He promised 
to ‘do right’ over Maurice’s actions — that is, he would provide a judgment on the acts of 
violence — but only if the abbot promised to ‘do right’ to Maurice over the latter’s land 
claim.80 Refusing to allow a plea over violentia to trump a claim for right reveals the 
important rôle played by court-holders such as Hubert in validating, or not, any given legal 
strategy.  
 This may go some ways towards explaining a rather puzzling issue: given the apparent 
readiness of many courts to judge on pleas of violentia, however fictitious the violence of 
those pleas actually was, why did men like Bouchard, Rouald, or Roscelin’s brothers still 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
historical studies to help make sense of legal pluralism more broadly are: Caroline Humfress, ‘Thinking through 
the Lens of Legal Pluralism: “Forum Shopping” in the Later Roman Empire’, in J. Duindam, Jill Harries, 
Caroline Humfress, and N. Hurvitz (eds.), Law and Empire: Ideas, Practices, Actors (Leiden, 2013), 225–50, 
and Ido Shahar, ‘Legal Pluralism and the Study of Shari’a Courts’, Islamic Law and Society, vol. 15, no. 1 
(2008), 112–41. 
77 On trying to reconstruct the law in the minds of past actors, see here Dirk Heirbaut, ‘Exploring the Law in 
Medieval Minds: The Duty of the Legal Historian to Write Books of Non-Written Law’, in Anthony Musson 
and Chantal Stebbings (eds.), Making Legal History: Approaches and Methodologies (Cambridge, 2012), 118–
30, and William Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was it Like to Try a Rat?’, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 143, no. 6 (1995), 1889–2149. 
78 SAA 430. 
79 The inheritance aspects of the case are discussed more fully in Stephen D. White, ‘Inheritances and Legal 
Arguments in Western France, 1050–1150’, Traditio, vol. 43 (1987), 55–103, esp. 73–6. 
80 SAA 430. 
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exercise the use of force? We can only speculate on this point, but there are several 
possibilities. One is that these men, and others like them, were brazen in their defiance of 
court-defined standards of behaviour — the use of actual force functions similar to the formal 
‘defiance’ of court-judgments discussed by Bruno Lemesle. Alternatively, such men may 
simply have read the legal landscape poorly, in the hopes that courts would not, in fact, 
intervene. Whether a failure of strategy derives from incompetence or simply bad luck does 
not matter, however: what does, is that within the context of eleventh-century courts, the 
cards were becoming increasingly stacked against Bouchard and men of his ilk. Violentia was 
actionable, and the prudent litigator would need, henceforth, to bear this in mind.  
 So our perspective has now shifted away from litigants and towards court-holders. Theirs 
remains the most elusive viewpoint in the disputing process to reconstruct, but, forms of legal 
complaint may provide an important clue as to what court-holders valued, and the patterns of 
legal thought their decisions encouraged. The question to ask now is why did violentia matter 
to such individuals?  
 
III 
The discourse of violentia mattered to court-holders, but why? One explanation would be to 
situate complaints of violentia within a framework of public order linked to comital 
jurisdiction. Comital courts feature prominently in the evidence, with some taking on the 
appearance of landmark cases concerned with public order. In 1040, for instance, shortly after 
his accession, Geoffrey Martel held a ‘general court’ (generale placitum) on the subject of 
‘evil customs’ in the ‘lands of the saints’ (terra sanctorum).81 Notice of this survives only in 
the archives of Saint-Florent, but there are hints that this was perhaps a county-wide court 
                                                          
81 Livre noir 28v–29r, which also survives as an original in Archives départementales de Maine-et-Loire H 1840, 
no. 5. 
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gathered specifically to deal with intrusions upon ecclesiastical lands.82 Similarly, the earliest 
surviving example of a judgment against a defendant because he had seized goods without 
first making a plaint (sine clamore) was issued by Geoffrey Martel’s court again, in a case 
heard between the monks of Saint-Aubin and Éon de Blaison in 1056 x 1060.83 The Angevin 
counts might have been particularly keen to promote a sense of public order, and to present 
their courts as the natural guarantors of that order.84   
 The public order line of argument can be extended to other jurisdictions as well. Lay 
jurisdictions may equally have held a commitment to maintaining the peace.85 It has 
traditionally been thought that such jurisdictions were modelled, more or less, on regalian 
notions of justice centred above-all in the concept of the bannum: the powers of command 
and punishment.86 Julien Maquet has recently stressed that the bannum carried the blueprint 
for governmental authority; the authority implicit in the bannum formed an important 
ideological component in the construction of seigneurial power as lords sought to ensure 
peace within their territories.87 Lay cultivation of an ideology of public order could easily 
have been sharpened through engagement with the comital court, where many of these lay 
                                                          
82 Bisson, Crisis of the Twelfth Century, 131 makes a similar point; see also Guillot, Le comte d’Anjou, i, 373. 
On the importance of Geoffrey Martel’s reign in the consolidation of Angevin government, see especially 
Olivier Guillot, ‘Sur la naissance de la coutume en Anjou au XIe siècle’, in Jacques Krynen (ed.), Droit romain, 
jus civile, et droit français. Études d’histoire du droit et des idées politiques no. 3 (Toulouse, 1999), 273–96, 
and idem, ‘Un Aperçu sur le gouvernement des états angevins aux premiers temps capétiens: les voies de 
l’accession au pluralisme (987–vers 1060)’, in Olivier Guillot and Robert Favreau (eds.), Pays de Loire et 
Aquitaine de Robert le Fort aux premiers capétiens (Poitiers, 1997), 229–51. 
83 SAA 178. See above, 0000. 
84 Lemesle, Conflits et justice, 31–81. Promotion of the comital court’s rôle in the maintenance of order cannot 
be separated from the processes of political expansion undertaken by the counts in the first half of the eleventh 
century, first in the Saumurois in the 1020s, the Vendômois in the 1030s, and the Touraine in the 1040s. Justice, 
as Martindale, ‘“His Special Friend”’, 39 notes, was a central component in stabilising political authority 
following conquest. For similar arguments about active comital promotion of public order in Gascony, see 
Couderc-Barraud, La Violence. 
85 Note the comments to this effect in François Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit français de ses origines à la 
Révolution (Paris, 1948), 129, 140–1. 
86 See the comments in Chris Wickham, ‘Defining the seigneurie since the War’, in Monique Bourin and 
Pascual Martínez Sopena (eds.), Pour une anthropologie du prélèvement seigneurial dans les campagnes 
médiévales (XIe–XIVe siècles). Réalités et représentations paysannes (Paris, 2004), 43–50; and Fredric L. 
Cheyette, ‘Georges Duby’s Mâconnais after Fifty Years: Reading it Then and Now’, Journal of Medieval 
History, vol. 28 (2002), 291–317 for historiographical discussion on the seigneurie banale. 
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court-holders appear as suitors, as well as by the ever-present moral voice of clerics extolling 
the virtues of pax.88 The capacity to define the parameters of violentia and to provide redress 
for victims of what was considered violentia thus had an important political dimension in the 
construction of territorial authority, as well as a strong moral dimension as laymen performed 
dutifully their Christian obligations to defend the church and the powerless.  
 Such arguments have much to recommend them, but they cannot provide a complete 
explanation.89 An emphasis on public order to account for why violentia mattered to 
eleventh-century court-holders minimises the political dimensions of lawsuits and 
misrepresents the agency of those court-holders themselves. Counts, for instance, had strong 
ties of friendship with the ecclesiastical institutions in whose favour they pronounced 
judgment. When in 1151 he crushed the lord of Montreuil-Bellay, razing his castle and 
quashing the ‘intolerable customs’ Berlai II had imposed upon Saint-Aubin, Geoffrey le Bel 
was apparently inspired by a vision of Saint Albinus who reminded him of the special 
relationship between the Angevin counts and the abbey of Saint-Aubin, a relationship which 
went back to the 960s when Geoffrey Greymantle (960–987) reformed the abbey.90 This was 
personal protection as much as it was a commitment to public order.91 Even cases where a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
87 Maquet, “Faire justice” dans le diocèse de Liège, esp. 543–5. Note the equivocation on this point, however, 
in Maïté Billoré, Isabelle Mathieu, and Carole Avignon. La Justice dans la France médiévale (VIIIe–XVe siècles) 
(Paris, 2012), 9. 
88 Lemesle, Conflits et justice, 71–80; idem, ‘Practiciens de la justice et juridictions (Haut-Maine, fin du XIe 
siècle)’, in Dominique Barthélemy and Olivier Bruand (eds.), Les Pouvoirs locaux dans la France du centre et 
de l’ouest (VIIIe–XIe siècles). Implantation et moyens d’action (Rennes, 2004), 215–32. For eleventh- and 
twelfth-century notions of pax from an ecclesiastical perspective, see now Jehangir Yezdi Malegam, The Sleep 
of Behemoth: Disputing Peace and Violence in Medieval Europe, 1000–1200 (Ithaca, 2013). 
89 For stimulating arguments on the construction of a lordship into a form of governmental authority, see in 
particular Débax, La Féodalité languedocienne, 269–325. 
90 The events of 1151 are recorded in SAA 864 (1151). See also the narrative accounts in Chronica vel sermo de 
rapinis, injusticiis et malis consuetudinibus a Giraudo de Mosteriolo exactis; et de eversione castri ejus a 
Gaufrido comite in Chroniques des églises d’Anjou, eds. Paul Marchegay and Émille Mabille (Paris, 1869), 83–
90 and Historia Gaufredi ducis Normannorum et comitis Andegavorum, eds. Louis Halphen and Réné 
Poupardin, in Chroniques des comtes d’Anjou et des seigneurs d’Amboise (Paris, 1913), 215–23. For the re-
foundation of Saint-Aubin in the 960s, see Guillot, Le comte d’Anjou, i, 138–51. 
91 Note Bisson, Crisis of the Twelfth Century, 137. Worth returning to in this regard is the classic Jacques Flach, 
Les Origines de l’ancienne France, Vol. I, Xe et XIe siècles. Le régime seigneurial (Paris, 1886), esp. 137ff. See 
also Richard E. Barton, ‘Between the King and the Dominus: The Seneschals of Plantagenet Maine and Anjou’, 
in Martin Aurell and Frédéric Boutoulle (eds.), Les Seigneuries dans l’espace plantagenêt (c.1150–c.1250) 
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generalised notion of public order was implied were still expressed in terms of protection. In 
c.1120, for example, the comital court, presided by Countess Arembourg at Baugé, judged 
against Robert Papa Bovem in favour of Marmoutier, and added that ‘they [the count and 
countess of Anjou] are lords and princes of this land to the effect that whosoever gives alms 
will see those alms immediately fall under their protection’ (statim sub eorum defensione 
devenirent).92 In one sense comital defence of churches was a form of public order, but to 
situate violentia within a conceptual paradigm of public order performs a slight-of-hand that 
minimises just how central patronage and protection were to jurisdiction, where the rationale 
of a protective jurisdiction was subtly but fundamentally different from an abstract 
commitment to public order.93  
 An emphasis on public order is important amidst the historiographical context of 
mutationisme which has interpreted the violentia of eleventh-century sources as the nadir of 
the feudal anarchy. But if we do away with the ‘alarmist rhetoric’ and ‘implicit moralism’ 
which has so coloured historians’ grim views of the eleventh century, not only can we discard 
views of anarchic disorder, but also the historiographical imperative to react to such 
descriptions by over-playing arguments for a particular kind of public order.94 A political 
thought which drew a connection between violence and its redress in legal fora acting in a 
quasi-public interest was not yet so internalised as to seem automatic. Public law’s 
sovereignty over violence is an ideological claim, and if a lay court in the 1080s, for instance, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Bourdeaux, 2009), 139–62, who argues convincingly that Angevin ‘public’ authority was only effective in the 
comital demesne, thereby softening arguments in favour of the growth of public government. 
92 MMA, [pp.] 45–7. 
93 I have benefitted greatly from T.B. Lambert, ‘Theft, Homicide and Crime in Late Anglo-Saxon Law’, Past 
and Present, no. 214 (2012), 3–43, and Justine Firnhaber-Baker, ‘Seigneurial War and Royal Power in Later 
Medieval Southern France’, Past and Present, no. 208 (2010), 37–76, when thinking about jurisdiction and 
protection. 
94 The phrases come from White, ‘The “Feudal Revolution”: Comment’, 221 and Wickham, ‘The “Feudal 
Revolution”: Comment’, 196 respectively. 
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seems to be making a similar claim, we need to understand why.95 Short of falling back on 
arguments for ‘the Invisible Hand of Custom’ where curial redress of violence reveals 
structural continuities with a distant Carolingian past — which fails to explain eleventh-
century jurisdiction on its own terms — we lack a satisfactory answer to this question.96 
Eleventh-century court-holders were not the passive conduits by which public order could 
descend from the Carolingians to the later Capetians: they were actively interested parties 
themselves. When a court-holder judged on a case of violentia, he — and less often she — 
was enacting complex political and ideological claims. Judgment was a political act. To 
understand the relationship between violentia and eleventh-century jurisdictions, therefore, 
we need to understand the political circumstances giving rise to this act.  
 
IV 
Politics were intrinsic to seigneurial justice. Over the course of the eleventh century, lords of 
all persuasions — comital or castellan, lay or ecclesiastic — sought to expand and 
consolidate the competence of their jurisdictional authority. The means by which this was 
accomplished were manifold, but centred above-all in the control of land and property rights. 
Lords sought new ways of extending their jurisdictional reach over property, and of 
consolidating that control once the foundations of their claims had been laid. The expansion 
of such jurisdiction rested on integrating property practices into a conceptual model of 
protective lordship, able to justify drawing landholders into seigneurial courts. A jurisdiction 
legitimated, in the first instance, upon protection and patronage engendered political 
                                                          
95 On the development of ideas of public law over the longue durée, see in particular Martin Loughlin, 
Foundations of Public Law (Oxford, 2010) and from a more general perspective, idem, The Idea of Public Law 
(Oxford, 2003).  
96 This phrase I take from Stephen D. White, ‘“The Peace in the Feud” Revisited: Feuds in the Peace in 
Medieval European Feuds’, in Kate Cooper and Conrad Leyser (eds.), Making Early Medieval Societies: 
Conflict and Belonging in the Latin West, 300–1200 (Cambridge, 2016), 223. 
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problems when it came to making decisions when faced with competing land claims. It is 
against this background that violentia took shape in eleventh-century courts.  
 The building blocks of seigneurial jurisdiction were many, and I want to mention just 
three here. The render of dues, either in cash or kind, provides the first. Such renders formed 
one of the primary means by which ties of dependence were formed and acted upon, binding 
those liable for renders to the lord entitled to collect them.97 Such ties had proprietary and 
jurisdictional implications: not only were renders often delivered in a lord’s court — payment 
was in effect a performance of dependence, personal and jurisdictional —, but obligations to 
pay renders also meant that lands from which they were due were actionable in that lord’s 
court, in the case of default.98 Further, the relationship between lords and ‘customs-men’ 
(consuetudinarii), as they were sometimes called in the charters, was conceptualised in terms 
of protection. Some charters lumped ‘customs’ and renders together under the rubric of the 
commendise, or ‘protection-money’, making the framework of protective lordship explicit: 
‘customs’ were, in this sense, literally the price to pay for the benefits of a lord’s protection.99 
 Our second building block is the practice whereby lords gave their assent to transfers of 
property within their territories.100 The fact that the lord’s territory was described as his (less 
often her) feodum or fevum — i.e., fief — should not mislead us into thinking that the 
practice has much of anything to do with classic models of feudalism familiar from 
                                                          
97 See the remarks in Laurent Feller, Paysans et seigneurs au Moyen Âge. VIIIe–XVe siècles (Paris, 2007), esp. 
153–6, and more broadly Bourin and Sopena (eds.), Pour une anthropologie du prélèvement seigneurial. Note 
also Chris Wickham, ‘Property Ownership and Signorial Power in Twelfth-Century Tuscany’, in W. Davies and 
P. Fouracre (eds.), Property and Power in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1995), 221–44. 
98 The importance of courts as centres for the delivery of renders comes out most clearly in disputes where the 
lord seeks to obtain the recognition in court by the disputant that he did in fact owe service to the lord. See for 
instance SAA 61 (1060 x 1081) in which two men were dragged into Saint-Aubin’s court after refusing to pay 
rents ‘which other burgesses were accustomed to pay.’ 
99 Feller, Paysans et seigneurs, 155. For an overview, see Pierre Duparc, ‘La Commendise ou commende 
personnelle’, Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes, vol. 119 (1961), 50–112. For disputes arising from the 
commendise in my sample, see e.g.: Livre noir 28r-v (990 x 1011), Livre noir 28v–29r (c.1040), SAA 146 (1114). 
100 See inter alia: Livre noir 51v–52r (c.1070), RA 206 (c.1110), RA 260 (c.1110), SAA 95 (1082 x 1106), SAA 
114 (1117), SAA 768 (c.1090), SSE i 4 (1090 x 1135), SSE i 122 (c.1100), SSE i 423 (c.1102 x 1113), SL 45 
(1103), FON 211 (1101 x 1108), FON 214 (1101 x 1108), FON 215 (1108 x 1116), FON 222 (1123 x 1124). 
See also Stephen D. White, Custom, Kinship, and Gifts to Saints: The Laudatio parentum in Western France, 
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textbooks.101 Lords consented to transfers of property as a means to assert a claim of 
jurisdiction over the property in question, rather than as an automatic function of the lord 
having originally granted it as a fief to the current alienor. Consent was an instrument to 
construct jurisdiction.102 Seigneurial consent was often obtained in the lord’s own court, 
making the relationship between a court’s authority and a particular piece of property explicit 
— indeed, like the delivery of rents or ‘customs’, consent was a performance of this legal 
relationship.103 Finally, also like the delivery of renders, seigneurial consent could be 
conceptualised within the framework of protection. This is seen most clearly in examples 
where lords gave their consent and promised, expressly, to defend the transferred property.104 
 This brings us to the third building block: warranty of land. Warranty refers to the 
practice whereby a lord promised to defend the beneficiaries of his patronage from outside 
challenge, and to provide compensation should he prove unable to acquit his obligation.105 
Clauses recording warranty obligations appear from the 1040s, and make the connection 
between warranty and a conceptual model of protective lordship obvious, not least because 
by the later eleventh century, verbs like ‘to defend’ (defendere) and ‘to protect’ (tueri, 
protegere) had become the most common ways of expressing warranty.106 Although warranty 
clauses only survive in connection with grants to churches, disputes show laymen calling 
upon their warrantors, indicating that the notions of protective lordship contained within 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1050–1150 (Chapel Hill, 1988), esp. the appendices on 222–7 which show that lords consented to between 15% 
and 25% of White’s sample property transactions in northwestern France, between c.1000 and c.1200. 
101 Note here Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals, esp. 146–52. 
102 Note here the comments in West, Reframing the Feudal Revolution, 203–5, though my emphasis on 
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England’, Law and History Review, vol. 5, no. 2 (1987), 437–503, which, although focussed on England, is 
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of Property in Eleventh-Century Norman Law (Chapel Hill, 1988), 196–204. 
106 For defendere: FON 180 (1119 x 1125), FON 308 (1115 x 1149), FON 514 (1108 x 1116), Livre noir 89r-v 
(1070 x 1086), Livre noir 91r-v (1072 x 1080), Livre noir 103v–104r (c.1058), RA 71 (1142), RA 130 (1110 x 
  31 
warranty were not limited to ecclesiastical landholders.107 Warranty thus ensured 
(theoretically, at least) a lasting relationship characterised as protection between lord and 
landholder. Warranty contained an implicit — sometimes explicit — jurisdictional claim, as 
well: those who received the lord’s warranty also agreed that the land in question was 
actionable within the lord’s court. Clauses where a lord promised to do justice in his own 
court offer explicit statements of what must have been a more common assumption.108  
 Each of these building blocks combined ideas of protective lordship with claims for 
jurisdictional authority over land — the authority of a court to deal with disputes concerning 
any given property. That these types of jurisdictional claim were expanding into new 
situations involving property can be seen in a few ways. The novelty of warranty clauses 
from the 1040s is one indication.109 Another comes from cases where a lord reclaimed land 
on the grounds that he had not consented to its original alienation.110 In c.1080, for instance, 
Berlai de Montreuil took mills into his demesne (in suo dominio), seizing the mills’ tithes 
from the monks of Saint-Nicolas; when asked by the monks why he had done so, he replied: 
‘because you have not asked that I give it to you, or that I allow you to have it (aut 
concederem); nor did the donors of the tithe ask my permission. Therefore, I am having and 
holding it because I have not consented.’ Berlai’s response implies uncertainty and novelty 
over when and in what circumstances consent was, in fact, necessary.111 Nevertheless, the 
result of sustained assertions to make concrete a lord’s jurisdictional claims worked over time 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1115), RA 279 (1110), SAA 288 (1060 x 1087), SAA 655 (1097); for tueri: SL 44 (1103), SSE i 6 (1082 x 1093), 
SSE i 55 (1102 x 1113), SSE i 243 (1093 x 1102), SSE ii [69] 120 (1056 x 1082). 
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to acculturate contemporaries — willing or not — to the fact that the basis for right in land 
was coming increasingly to depend on the authority of a seigneurial court, packaged, in the 
first instance, within the conceptual framework of protection. 
 Protection was, of course, political. It was a discourse aimed at legitimating the 
relationship of lordship and dependence, of structuring inequalities between persons. The 
enthusiasm with which the claims of would-be lord-protectors were greeted no doubt varied 
considerably. For a small-scale landowner paying rents, acceptance may often have been 
grudging; the close follower of a lord, conversely, no doubt willingly sought the securities 
offered by his lord’s court. There could be considerable scope for tension and resistance to 
the claims of lords — not least in a refusal to acknowledge that one’s property rights 
depended on seigneurial authority. Nevertheless, protection worked as a universalising 
discourse, despite the very different origins to the practices it served to justify, meaning that 
structural ambiguity was at the heart of seigneurial jurisdiction. And this ambiguity created 
problems. Any combination of landholding, justiciability, and protection was bound to pose 
challenges in the context of disputes. Behind the question of whose right in land was greater, 
party A or party B, were conflicting ways of understanding how lordship had been 
superimposed on property practices. Imagine the following case: the landholder (A) who pays 
rent twice a year to a lord (C) finds his land claimed by another landholder (B), claiming to 
have received C’s warranty for that same land, and the case enters C’s court. On its surface, 
this case is about right in land, but beneath the surface also lie expectations of C — the 
expectation that the different forms of protective lordship binding A and B to C would count 
for something. Court cases were thus seldom bilateral conflicts, but instead three-dimensional 
disputes. Cases turning on land claims posed hard questions: lords and their courts were 
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asked, albeit implicitly, to choose one interpretation of lordship, to prioritise one form of 
patronage over another.112 
 Politics and patronage were the problems here, and decisions in seemingly 
straightforward questions of whether A or B had a stronger claim to right in land had a 
marked political quality.113 Litigants had long memories, and the losing party could easily 
draw conclusions about the relationship between past performances in court instantiating the 
lord’s jurisdictional authority over landholder, and current political decision. Decision-
making in such cases was vulnerable to charges of patronage: the defeated party could 
reasonably ask the extent to which political favour, rather than right, determined the outcome 
of the case. Indeed, such was inevitable when the conceptual distinction between lordship and 
rights in land became blurrred.  
 Concerns over the blurred lines between law and politics were made explicit at times. 
Between 1080 x 1096, for instance, Abbot Natalis of Saint-Nicolas approached Hugh de 
Chantocé to warrant (acquitaret) his earlier gift to the monks when Hugh’s knight (miles), 
Gautier, challenged it; but Hugh found himself in a tight spot, unwilling at the same time ‘to 
cause distress to his baron and for Saint-Nicolas to have contested property.’114 Indeed, the 
gravitas attached to loyalty (fidelitas, fides) as a rationale for avoiding conflict between lord 
and client at both the élite and non-élite level is one way of representing concerns over the 
political dimensions of land cases.115 Similarly, open defiance of judgments — that is the 
refusal to accept a court’s decision — must often have arisen out of doubts over the court’s 
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115 For the non-élite level, see Lemesle, Conflits et justice, 235–8, analysing SL 7 (1067 x 1100). 
  34 
partiality.116 Patronage could be such a concern to court-holders that they would even award 
further proof to victors, as did the count of Redon to the monks of Saint-Florent de Saumur, 
‘lest he seem to favour the monks unduly’ in a judgment against Giron, son of Robert 
Avenel.117 Perceptions of justice mattered both to litigants and courts, and the trick was to 
find a way to mask the fact that judicial decision-making in property claims could quickly 
become an expression of political will. 
 This is an old problem, and was a central tenet of the legal-historical tradition of la 
justice féodale.118 Views of the ‘feudal anarchy’ took the evidence of violentia as the direct 
consequence of this patrimonial justice; individuals, it was thought, turned to self-help to 
pursue their claims out of doubts for a fair hearing in court.119 Historiography since the 1970s 
has done surprisingly little to revise this particular view of the relationship between eleventh-
courts and violentia, content to rationalise the violence, but to leave unchallenged the a priori 
assumption that the prominence of accounts of violentia was conditioned by a widespread 
crisis of confidence in court-based justice. But, rather than interpreting violentia as the 
product of a wider structural crisis in eleventh-century legal institutions, we can view the 
discourse of violentia as a legal solution to the problems outlined above. Violentia worked as 
a form of legal plaint and argument to divert the immediacy of questions over patronage and 
politics. When litigants separated acts of wrongdoing from the context of larger land claims, 
they sought to present the court-holder with substantive issues fundamentally different from 
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the question of right (ius): did the defendant’s actions fit into the categories of violentia, and 
was the defendant guilty of such an act?  
 Judgment on violentia was no less a political act than judgment on a land claim: but 
judgment on violentia masked the immediacy of this act. How violentia functioned as a mask 
is difficult to see in cases — often impossible given that so much of the evidence was 
produced after the plaintiff had achieved a successful outcome.120 But one dispute shows the 
defendant explicitly call into question the way violentia masked deeper property claims. In 
1143, the monks of Saint-Aubin brought a plaint (querimonia) to Count Geoffrey le Bel 
about the violentia done to them by Engressus, the count’s seneschal.121 The violentia in 
question was that Engressus had ordered ditches be made for irrigation in monastic land, and 
the monks stressed the harm and loss (dampna) suffered ‘by the violence’ (per violentiam) of 
the seneschal. The plaint was enough to convince Geoffrey to act: he summoned Engressus 
‘to his presence’, and forbade him from harassing the monks, confirming the immunity they 
claimed had been violated. Engressus, however, ‘hearing that his impudence had been put to 
an end’, claimed that the count was doing him harm by devaluing the vicaria (judicial rights) 
he (Engressus) had accepted from him.122 Geoffrey therefore offered judgment on the matter, 
ordering his judges to decide if the count had done wrong (injuriam) to Engressus. When the 
judges retreated to deliberate, Engressus — perhaps wisely — agreed to follow the count’s 
wishes, abandoning his claim and thus avoiding judgment. The lessons to draw from the case 
could not be clearer. Violentia worked in an almost superficial way to reach a decision in a 
case that had very little to do with violence. The case is exceptional in that the defendant 
convicted of violentia called the court out, demanding judgment on the proprietary issue 
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violentia had masked: that is, to judge on the normative status of the defendant’s right which 
derived, ultimately, from his relationship to his lord.   
 The language of violentia reveals, therefore, a legal discourse taking shape amidst the 
context of larger changes in how contemporaries envisaged property rights, and the political 
problems arising from an increasingly close relationship between lordship and property 
rights. Legal decisions in land claims blurred the line between the operation of law and the 
exercise of political patronage, so much so that disgruntled litigants could complain of the 
arbitrary expression of lordly favour. Decisions over violentia, often isolated from their larger 
context of a land claim, softened the immediacy of this patronage. In entertaining legal 
complaints and arguments focused on violentia, court-holders structured the decisions 
reached in their courts in such a way where the operation of law — that is to say, judgment 
informed by legal rules — appeared to be separate from the exercise of political power. The 
discourse of violentia occupied a conceptual, functional space where the act of judgment was 
delivered on issues at a measure of distance from the immediate circumstances arising from 
conflicting claims upon lordly patronage.  
 Who this discourse sought to convince is another question altogether. Court-holders had 
an obvious interest in presenting the decisions of their courts in as legitimate a way as 
possible, but much of the best evidence from this paper is valuable precisely because the 
mask of violentia failed to convince the losing party. That losers were unsatisfied with 
adverse decisions should not surprise us, but it does raise larger questions of the audience for 
violentia. We can only speculate on this point. Nevertheless, the force of violentia as a means 
of structuring legal decision-making needs to be set alongside the capacity for a language of 
property rights to accomplish the same task. When rights were coming to be integrated into 
models of lordship with an alarming complexity, forceful statements of those rights based on 
patronage must have seemed especially precarious. For the wider political community that 
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formed the composition of any seigneurial court, and whose property was, to varying degrees, 
becoming dependent on the authority of that court, violentia may have seemed a more 
palatable way to determine the outcome of cases. The alternative was to expose the hard truth 
that the ties of protection binding individual, land, and court were not, after all, very strong, 
and on another day, any suitor could find himself falling afoul of seigneurial favour. 
Violentia thus operated as a collective fiction, enabling the political community to rationalise 
to itself the internal contradictions of nascent proprietary jurisdiction.  
 
* *   * 
We are now in a better position to make sense of the violentia mentioned in eleventh-century 
charters. Such language is evidence for the strategies and patterns of legal argument used by 
litigants when presenting their legal claims. Although there was, no doubt, much actual 
violence underneath such language — whether that be the violence of lordly thuggery or the 
more ordered self-help —, it is vital to stress that the evidence used to substantiate such 
claims is often, actually, depicting forms and patterns of legal argument brought before court-
holders. The discourse of violentia therefore cannot be taken as a straightforward indication 
of the absence, weakness, or failure of contemporary legal institutions to limit violence. This 
discourse of violentia in fact makes little sense outside those very institutions. Violentia is 
better read as evidence for the vitality of eleventh-century courts as centres which diffused 
patterns of thought and legal behaviour, for institutions which spread a conceptual framework 
in which to think about violence.   
 Courts have been central to my argument. Throughout this paper, violentia has been 
treated as a discourse intrinsic to the construction of eleventh-century political and legal 
authority. But this process cannot be explained exclusively, or even primarily, as an attempt 
by court-holders to assert symbolic and/or institutional claims upon the monopolisation of 
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legitimate force. Keeping the peace within an eleventh-century territorial lordship was, of 
course, important; but this was not the basis of political and legal authority within such 
structures. Rather, control of patronage was key.123 This can be seen through the diverse 
means lords used to put into practice relations of jurisdictional dependence between their own 
courts and local landholders. It was in these property practices that we approach the core 
elements in the construction of eleventh-century political authority.124 Amidst this context, 
violentia acquired significance as a legal concept. Its legal utility seems less ideological, and 
more the practical response to the political problems raised in the development of lordly 
jurisdictions. The dialectic from which violentia took shape as a legal argument was 
concerned less with claims to limit actual violence, and more with attempts to circumvent 
thorny land claims. This is vital if we are to move forward in understanding not only violence 
in the eleventh century, but more importantly, courts and jurisdiction. 
 The relationship between violentia and deeper issues of an emerging proprietary 
jurisdiction can be teased out from a final example. In c.1063 the abbess of Le Ronceray, 
after obtaining a judgment in her favour against Fulcrède de Rochefort wrote to Count 
Geoffrey le Barbu asking, ‘O count, the abbess asks you whether or not [she can] seize 
(invadere) his land?’125 The case usefully shows a litigant attuned to the potential legal 
consequences of violence, and seeking sanction — and probably assistance — prior to taking 
action. The abbess had already obtained a favourable judgment, meaning the interest of this 
particular case lies in the fact that she sought permission prior to the use of force. That the 
abbess of Le Ronceray even asked such a question invites speculation on a broader point. 
One could interpret this as evidence for the existence of some form of public order ready to 
sanction the illicit use of force, but this line of argument would stop short and miss a crucial 
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observation. Restraint from violence encouraged the formulation of claims and counter-
claims within the conceptual categories of landholding and lordship taking shape in 
contemporary legal institutions. The potential legal consequences of violentia channelled 
legal claims into the framework which emphasised precisely the sort of relationship between 
lordship and right which was so problematic. Here we find the real structural transformation 
from the Carolingian period: there seems little reason to agree with the view that the eleventh 
century witnessed a ‘large-scale shift in the normative order’ regarding how contemporaries 
thought about violence — the willingness of legal institutions to judge on matters of violence 
actually looks like major continuity.126 But how contemporaries envisaged the relationship 
between force and the pursuit of property rights was in flux. The motor of these changes was 
the gradual emergence of new forms of jurisdictional authority, of a proprietary jurisdiction 
where lordship was superimposed on rights in property. Thus, how historians approach the 
subject of violentia can give insight into the profound changes in how eleventh-century 
individuals understood property rights, the consequences of which would continue to be felt 
well beyond the eleventh century.  
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